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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which local budget
spending composition reacts to fiscal rules variations. I consider the budget of
Italian municipalities and exploit specific changes in the Domestic Stability Pact’s
rules, to perform a difference-in-discontinuities analysis. The results show that not
all rules are equally effective: imposing a cap on the total amount of consumption
and investment is not as binding as two caps, one specific for consumption and a
different one for investment spending. More specifically, the consumption variation
is triggered by changes in the level of wages and services spending, while
investment relies on infrastructure movements. In addition, there is evidence that
when an increase in investment is achieved, there is also a higher budget deficit
level.
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1 Introduction
Rules for coordinating the financial relationship among different levels of government
have the purpose of guaranteeing both macroeconomic stability and financial
sustainability. The rationale of fiscal rules stems from two main concepts. The first one
is the common pool problem, whereby the presence of imbalances financed by the
common pool of national taxes through central transfers generates an incentive for local
governments to excessively increase local expenditure (Rodden, 2002). The second
concept is related to the fact that whenever a local administration defaults, the national
level generally intervenes with transfers of more resources to the local level. This creates
an insurance effect and a problem of moral hazard.
In case of Italy, local governments are subject to financial distress. As shown in
Figure 1, in the period between 1989 and 2012 there are 460 municipalities where a
default occurred1. This situation creates social and financial instability at the local level
and might also affect the national level if the central government needs to reallocate
resources. Indeed, a recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights point in
this direction2. In fact, the Court states that when a m suffers financial distress, the
Central level has to guarantee for its debt refund. Consequently, fiscal rules play a central
role and their ability to affect budget decisions is crucial.
[Figure 1 about here]
Beyond this, subnational rules could also be implemented with the aim of fostering
virtuous behaviors. Public spending can focus on consumption or investment. Ganelli
and Tervala (2010) affirm that the reallocation of consumption in favor of capital
spending might generate welfare gains. In the case of Italian municipalities, the amount
of consumption compared to investment spending has changed over time. As shown in
Figure 1, the overall consumption of municipalities was 3.96% of GDP in 1990, while
1In addition, from the mid-1990s onwards, decentralized governments have made significant recourse
to financial tools such as derivatives, mainly Interest Rate Swaps. The number of municipalities that
had derivative transaction in 2007 was above 600 (as shown in the “Financial Stability Report” of Banca
d’Italia in 2013). They have been exposed to market volatility, which has generated potential liability
and, sometimes, financial distress. For instance, Milan signed a contract of derivatives for a total amount
of 1.5 billion Euro in 2005 and after a few years had to face a potential loss of 200 million Euro. For this
reason, the city of Milan called banks who proposed the transaction to court, arguing that the city had
been duped. Moreover, smaller Municipalities have come up against this issue, such as Alessandria and
Acqui Terme, who decided to stop paying their derivatives’ liabilities to banks.
2See the European Court of Human Rights “Case of De Luca vs Italy”, n. 43870/04 and the Il Sole
24 Ore’s article of the article of September 24th, 2013 entitled “La Corte Ue condanna l’Italia: i debiti
dei Comuni falliti vanno pagati”.
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investment was 2.47%. The distance between these two types of spending subsequently
decreased in the following years: in 2005 consumption and investment reached 3.32%
and 3.01% of GDP, respectively. However, starting from 2006 onwards, this trend has
reverted.
[Figure 2 about here]
The aim of this paper is to empirically assess the extent to which public spending of
Italian municipalities is affected by fiscal rules. For this purpose, I exploit specific
aspects of the Institutional framework. Since 1999 the Italian Government has
implemented fiscal rules under the so-called Domestic Stability Pact (hereafter DSP), in
order to coordinate and control subnational budget balances. Peculiar features of the
DSP give the opportunity to study a natural experiment implementing a
difference-in-discontinuity technique.
This paper provides evidence that fiscal rules are not equally effective, but rather they
crucially depend on how they are designed. In particular, differences arise concerning
whether it is imposed a cap on the overall amount of public spending or if there are two
limits, differentiating between consumption and investment. In addition, this paper also
highlights the extent to which the budget composition reacts to fiscal rules. When a
reduction in consumption is imposed, there is a significant effect of the same sign on the
quantity of services offered,whereas while when an increase in investment is allowed, there
is a positive variation on the amount of infrastructure spending. Interestingly, there is
also a significant increase in the deficit level in the latter case.
This evidence shows the existence of a trade-off, whereby rules that favor investment
also cause deficit. The policy maker should take into account these design issues: on one
hand only certain rules are actually binding while, on the other hand, rules might have
effects that go beyond the initial normative goal.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the related
literature, while section 3 analyses the normative framework. Section 4 provides the
preliminary analysis and section 5 shows the identification strategy. Sections 6 illustrates
the empirical findings, before section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Fiscal rules are generally justified because they substitute reputation when government
policy is discretionary and time-inconsistent.
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In the case of subnational fiscal rules, the debate is controversial, with the theoretical
literature suggesting advantages and disadvantages. Authors such as Eichengreen and
von Hagen (2004) and Rodden (2004) are in favor of these rules, believing that the scope
for subnational fiscal rules is higher when there are severe fiscal imbalances, possibly
increased by the decentralization process. In fact, when more functions are delegated to
local governments, their spending power rises and imbalances might worsen. In addition,
local governments have incentives to free ride on fiscal discipline for different reasons:
they can rely on a common pool of national resources (Weingast, 2006); sometimes they
are “too big to fail” (Wildasin, 1997), and private creditors on the capital market expect
that central government will guarantee for local debts (Daﬄon, 2002). Milesi-Ferretti
(2004) argues against subnational fiscal rules, suggesting that local rules might lead to
“ugly outcomes” for local governments, such as creative accounting and window dressing.
Ter-Minassian (Ter-Minassian) affirms that fiscal rules should only be implemented if
financial markets or cooperative arrangements across government levels cannot enforce or
reach financial discipline.
From an empirical perspective, the DSP has captured the attention of different
authors. Patrizii et al. (2006) have addressed the ability of regions and local
governments to meet the DSP requirements, whereas Brugnano and Rapallini (2010)
evaluate the effects of the DSP on local public borrowing requirements from 1999 to
2005. Bartolini and Santolini (2009) conduct a panel data analysis on the current
expenditures of 246 Italian municipalities to capture the impact of the DSP on both the
opportunistic behavior of incumbent politicians and the yardstick competition. They
show that the introduction of the DSP significantly reduces the level of public spending
but strengthens the opportunistic behavior of incumbent politicians in pre-electoral
years. Other authors focus on the “effectiveness” approach, in dealing with the impact of
fiscal rules on local administrations’s ability to achieve fiscal discipline and
sustainability. In particular, Balduzzi and Grembi (2010) implement a
difference-in-difference methodology on Italian municipalities considering the period
1999-2004 and show that the DSP has a positive and significant impact on current
expenditures and taxes’ revenues. Galli and Grembi (2010) focus the attention on
“special” municipalities3 between 1999 and 2000 using a difference-in-difference
approach. Their results show that the revenue side is affected when the DSP is imposed,
while there are not significant variations in relation to expenditures’ decisions. Grembi
et al. (2012) analyze Italian Municipalities between 1999 and 2004, implementing a
3Which are part of the so-called “special status” regions and provinces.
4
difference-in-discontinuities approach. They highlight that relaxing fiscal rules provokes
a deficit bias, shifting from zero to 2% of total budget, with this variation mainly driven
by adjustment on the revenue side.
With respect to the previous literature, this paper contributes to the effectiveness
branch of research. The novelty of this work stems from the analysis of specific fiscal
rules designed to influence local public spending (i.e. caps on the expenditure side of the
budget). It is shown that there are both effective and ineffective fiscal rules. Furthermore,
when investment spending increases, there is also a positive reaction in terms of the deficit
level.
3 Normative framework
Italian municipalities are subject to the Law for Local Authorities4, which states goals
and duties that have to pursue. Moreover, starting from 1999, the central government
has set the DSP in order to honor commitment taken with the European Institutions.
Since its introduction, the DSP has implemented different types of rules, particularly: a)
a balanced budget, whereby the total amount of revenues has to equal the total amount of
expenditures; b) expenditure caps, through which there might be ceilings on total current
expenditure or specific expenditure items; c) ceilings on local level revenues, which allow
the central government to limit local authorities’ ability to increase revenue; d) limits on
the stock of debt or the issuance of new debt; e) restrictions on the type of expenditure
that can be financed by debt, which usually state that only investment expenditure may be
financed through debt (known as “Golden Rule”), requiring a clear definition of investment
expenditure to avoid current expenditure being transferred to investments; f) indicators
of the ability to service the debt.
Considering that this paper aims to study the extent to which fiscal rules affect local
public spending, I am particularly interested in rules designed to have an impact on it.
The DSP has implemented this kind of rule twice. In particular, a cap on the total
expenditures was set in 2005, which could not be higher than the average spending of the
previous three years, augmented by 11.5%5. In the following year, the limit on the overall
spending was removed, while different ceilings on current and capital expenditures were
4Law n. 367/2000. In particular, the actual functions are presented by the DPR 167/1996 and cover
a wide range of subjects, such as general administration, justice, local police, public education (up to
primary school and part of secondary school), culture, sport, tourism, local public transportation, urban
development, social sector, economic development, productive local services.
5Further details are shown in the Finance law n. 311, December 30, 2004 and Document of Ministry
of Economy and Finance (“Circolare della Ragioneria Generale dello Stato”) n. 4 of February 8, 2005.
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added. Consumption was the most penalized, with the rule imposing a cut of 6.5%. On
the other hand, investment was allowed to increase by 8.1%6. For the purpose of this
analysis, I should also highlight DSP rules in the year prior to the introduction of the
caps, because I am analyzing the variation of public spending from one year to the next.
Thus, in 2004 the DSP imposed the budget balance as target rule.
There is also another crucial element to consider, namely that the number of
municipalities subject to the DSP has changed over time. The Pact only constrained
municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants in 2004 and 2006, while in 2005 the
threshold decreased to 3,000, as summarized in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here]
This normative framework provides an opportunity to study the extent to which fiscal
rules can affect budget spending decisions at the local level through a natural experiment,
as described in the following sections.
4 Preliminary analysis
The normative framework shows that the analysis should focus on the period between
2004 and 2006. Data concerning local budgets is derived from the Italian Ministry of the
Interior’s website7 and covets all Italian municipalities. The outcome of interest refers
to budget values, and particularly consumption and investment spending8. Values are
expressed in Euro per-capita and deflated using 2006 as the reference year.
The DSP is set at the national level, although the so-called “special autonomy”
provinces and regions are treated differently and therefore had to be excluded from the
6For both consumption and investment the benchmark level is the one of two years previously. Further
details are shown in the Finance law n. 266, December 23, 2005 and Document of Ministry of Economy
and Finance (“Circolare della Ragioneria Generale dello Stato”) n. 8 of February 17, 2006.
7See http://finanzalocale.interno.it/.
8Consumption spending is divided into the following categories: Employees, Raw Material, Services
and Interests paid on Debt. Investment are detailed in Infrastructures, Goods for internal production,
Durable goods, Consulting services, Transfers and Credits. Expenditures are composed by a further
category which considers the amount of principal repaid on debt. Current budget revenues are divided in
the following categories: Taxes, Fees & Tarrifs, Current Central Transfers, Current Regional Transfers,
Extra-tributary revenues. Capital revenues are split into Alienations, Capital Central Transfers, Capital
Regional Transfers, Real estate transfers, Deficit (defined as new loans stipulated by the municipality as
shown in the balance sheet in “Titolo V - Entrate derivanti da accensioni di prestiti”.). All the budget
values represent the accrual basis of accounting.
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sample9. The dataset also includes information from the National Institute of Statistics
about the geographical characteristics of municipalities10 which is useful when
robustness checks are implemented.
According to the institutional framework, municipalities are grouped in relation to
their number of inhabitants: Group A includes those with up to 3,000 people; Group B
between 3,000 and 5,000, and Group C above 5,000. Arguably, small and large
municipalities might have different behaviors in terms of budget policies and thus it
seems reasonable to limit the sample to municipalities with between 1,000 and 7,000
inhabitants11.
This preliminary analysis intends to explore consumption and investment spending to
provide an intuition of possible DSP effects, with the aim of highlighting different behavior
between the three groups during the examined period (2004, 2005 and 2006 are named t1,
t2 and t3, respectively). Subsequently, these findings will be further investigated through
the empirical analysis (see section 6).
In t2, the DSP imposed a cap on total spending to municipalities with more than 3,000
inhabitants. The sum of consumption and investment increased for the non-constrained
group (Group A) by 2.8% from t1 to t2, while for Groups B and C it decreased by 2.3%
and 3.1%, respctively. Table 2 shows the budget values.
[Table 2 about here]
In t3, municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants had to face a different rule.
Instead of having just one cap on budget spending, there were two different caps: one
on consumption and another on investment. Interestingly, from t2 to t3, the constrained
group (Group C) reported a different trend in terms of budget composition compared to
the other groups, as shown in Figure 3. In particular, Group B reached a consumption
level that was 1.76 times the investment in 2006. By contrast, Group C did not increase
this relationship from t2 to t3. Such budget spending variation might be due to either
a consumption or investment change. Table 2 shows the mean budget values for each
group, highlighting that consumption changed between t1 and t3 by 1.5%, 0% and -4.5%
9They have the power to bargain fiscal rules directly with the Central Government. Consequently,
municipalities of the autonomous provinces of Trento and Bolzano and the autonomous regions of Sicilia,
Sardegna, Valle D’Aosta, Trentino-Alto-Adige and Friuli-Venezia-Giulia have not been considered.
10In particular: i) total surface of each Municipality in square kilometers; ii) altitude of the Town hall
in meters; iii) altitude zone: Inland mountain, Coastal mountain, Inland Hill, Coastal Hill, Plain; iv)
macro-area: Northwest (Piemonte, Lombardia, Liguria), Northeast (Veneto, Emilia-Romagna), Centre (
Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio), South (Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria).
11The number of municipalities analyzed is 42% of the total.
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respectively for Group A, B and C, mainly due to variation in services. On the other
hand, investment changed by -6.3%, -20.4% and -15% for Group A, B and C, respectively,
mostly due to infrastructure spending12.
[Figure 3 about here]
As a preliminary comment, there is evidence of a variation in the budget composition
during the analyzed period, with the three groups demonstrating different behaviors.
This can be due to fiscal rules imposed by the DSP, with the next section focusing on the
identification strategy to exploit this possibility accordingly.
5 Identification Strategy
The institutional framework analyzed in section 3 explained that decisions related to
the DSP rules are made by the central government, and are therefore exogenous with
respect to local dynamics. Specifically, I would like to assess rules designed to influence
budget spending, namely: (i) a total expenditure cap and (ii) consumption and investment
caps. For this purpose, I need to identify a treated and control group, and a treatment.
Considering Groups A, B, C and t1, t2, t3 as defined in the previous section, the analysis
involves two steps, each comprising two cases.
As shown in Figure 4, the first step focuses on Groups A and B, which are the control
and treated group, respectively, and the threshold is set at 3,000 inhabitants. There are
two cases in relation to the period analyzed. Case IA studies t1 and t2, where the treatment
is the imposition of the total expenditure cap to Group B, while Case IB analyzes t2 and
t3, whereby the treatment is the exemption from the total expenditure cap for Group B.
[Figure 4 about here]
The second step relies on results from the first step (as shown in the next section) and
considers Group B and C, the control and treated group, respectively, with the threshold
set at 5,000 (see Figure 5). As before, there are two cases in relation to the period
analyzed. Case IB studies t1 and t2, where the treatment is the variation of the fiscal rule
from “Budget balance” to “Total expenditure cap” for Group C, while Case IIB analyzes
t2 and t3, whereby the treatment is the variation of the fiscal rules from “total expenditure
cap” to “consumption and investment caps” for Group C.
12Mean values have been tested using the t-test and groups have statistically different means at the
95% confidence interval.
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[Figure 5 about here]
The reminder of the section focuses on the formal approach used for the aforementioned
cases.
5.1 General setting
To assess the causal effect of each fiscal rule (the treatment) on the treated group, it
is necessary to consider a minimum set of assumptions to perform the analysis (Angrist
et al., 1996). Potential budget outcomes Y are the variables of interest and the actual
treatment D13 depends on the variable Z, which is equal to 1 when a municipality is
assigned to the treatment, while Z = 0 when it is assigned to the control group. The
potential budget outcome of municipality m at time t depends on Z and D, which can
more formally noted as Ymt = Ym(Zt, Dt). Therefore, the outcome is Ymt(1) when the
municipality is treated and Ymt(0) when it is not. The following assumptions should be
considered:
(i) Stable unit treatment value assumption: the potential outcomes and treatments
of unit m are independent from the potential assignment, treatments and outcomes of
n 6= m. Consequently, when a municipality is subject to the treatment, it should not
influence the other one (no general equilibrium effects);
(ii) non-zero average causal effect of Z on D: the probability of treatment must be
different between the two groups. Therefore, it is required that whoever is assigned to the
treatment actually gets the treatment, or at least part of the component of the treated
group. In other words, some level of compliance is necessary14;
(iii) the exclusion restriction should hold. Consequently, the assignment only affects
the outcome through the treatment;
(iv) monotonicity. No one does the opposite of its assignment, regardless what the
assignment is. Thus, the absence of defiers is required. Specifically, a defier would be a
municipality that follows the DSP rules without any formal obligation;
(v) random assignment: all municipalities have the same probability of getting the
treatment.
It should be noted that assumption (v) cannot hold due to the fact that the assignment
is not random, but rather conditioned to the population level. In this case, a Sharp
13The actual treatment is assumed to be beyond the researcher control (Angrist et al., 1996).
14In order to have a high compliance level, the DSP also introduces incentives. Patrizii et al. (2006)
show that municipalities are compliant to the DSP.
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Regression Discontinuity Design (SRDD) could be implemented, imposing the following
assumptions:
(vi) assignment to treatment must only depend on observable pre-intervention
variables (i.e. the population level);
(vii) identification of the mean treatment effect is only possible at the threshold;
(viii) the continuity of potential outcome: limits of the expected values have to be
identical at the cutoff. In other words, the budget outcomes of municipalities just before
and after the cutoff level should be equal.
Under these assumptions, the SRDD can be written as (Angrist and Pischke, 2008):
lim
δ→c
E[Ym|Pc < Pm < Pc + δ]− E[Ym|Pc − δ < Pm < Pc] = E[Ym(1)− Ym(0)|Pm = Pc]
where Pc is the population at the cutoff level, δ represents a small number, Ym and Pm
are the potential budget outcome and population of Municipality m. The estimand of this
nonparametric estimation strategy is the average causal effect, E[Ym(1)−Ym(0)|Pm = Pc].
However, assumption (viii) raises some issues. In order to identify the causal effect at
the cut-off point, any discontinuity in the relationship between the outcome of interest and
the variable determining the treatment status must be fully attributable to the treatment
itself. However, there is a confounding discontinuity policy at the cut-offs, due to a
change in the wage level of local politicians. In fact, the three groups of municipalities
guarantee different wages in relation to the population level, with a jump at 3,000 and
5,000 inhabitants (exactly at the cutoffs). As shown by Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013),
better-paid politicians are able to improve internal efficiency, sizing down the government
machine. Consequently, there is a confounding policy that might alter the identification
strategy. To overcome this issue, the approach described in the following subsection can
be implemented.
5.2 Difference-in-Discontinuities
The confounding policy that inhibits the effectiveness of the SRDD strategy is constant
over the analyzed period, and thus a Difference-in-Discontinuities (DiDisc) framework
can be implemented, as shown in Grembi et al. (2012)15. This allows studying the sharp
discontinuity at the threshold and, thanks to the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) design,
15This methodology combines the Difference-in-Difference strategy and a Regression Discontinuity
Design.
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remove the constant confounding discontinuity policies (i.e. different wage policies among
municipalities). The assumptions that should hold are as follows:
(ix) the confounding discontinuity needs to be time invariant. This assumption requires
that the effect of wage variations on budget outcome among groups not to vary with time;
(x) the interaction between the treatment and the confounding discontinuity has to
be irrelevant. Therefore, different wage policies should not generate a different reaction
compared to fiscal rules introduced by the DSP.
Under these assumptions, there is an estimator φ̂ that identifies the local treatment
effect φ:
φ̂ ≡ ( lim
Pm↑Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t1]− lim
Pm↓Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t1])+
−( lim
Pm↑Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t0]− lim
Pm↓Pc
E[Ymt|Pm, t = t0])
(1)
where Ymt is the potential budget outcome for municipality m at time t, Pm is the
population level, t1 is the year of the treatment and t0 is the previous one.
For each case, the assignment to the treatment is given by the dummy Dmt which
takes the value:
Dmt =

0 if t = t0
0 if Pm ≤ Pc, t = t1
1 if Pm > Pc, t = t1
(2)
where Pc is the cutoff level. Having described the DiDisc strategy, we can now proceed
to the empirical model.
5.3 Empirical models
To estimate the DiDisc estimator I use two different methods16.
The first one is the “Local Linear Regression” (LLR) method, which fits the data with
linear regression functions in a specific sample range. The interval is limited considering
a certain distance “d ”, thus Pm ∈ [Pc − d, Pc + d]. The estimated model is:
16See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Grembi et al. (2012).
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Ymt =α0 + α1P˜m +Gm(β0 + β1P˜m)+
+ t1(γ0 + γ1P˜m +Gm(δ0 + δ1P˜m)) + mt
(3)
where Ymt is the budget outcome for municipality m at time t, P˜m is the normalized
population size (P˜m=Pm − Pc), Gm is a dummy equal to 1 when a city is part of the
treated group and 0 otherwise, t1 is the treatment year, α0 is the intercept and mt is the
error term. Considering that the treatment is Dmt = Gmt1, the coefficient δ0 is the DiDisc
estimator17
The second method is the “Spline Polynomial Approximation” (SPA), which relaxes
the linearity assumption of the previous method and uses polynomial functions of order η
to fit the relationship between the outcome of interest Ymt and the population level Pc18.
The estimated model is:
Ymt =
η∑
n=0
(αkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(βkP˜
η
m)+
+ t1[
η∑
n=0
(γkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(δkP˜
η
m)] + mt
(4)
where the variables and the DiDisc estimator are defined as in the LLR method.
6 Results
Empirical results are divided between the first (Case IA and IB) and second (Case IIA and
IIB) step and focus on consumption and investment spending budget outcomes, showing
the DiDisc estimator. The empirical models are represented by equations (3) and (4): the
LLR is performed at two different bandwidths, b=1,500 (LLR1) and b=1,300 (LLR2),
while the SPA is implemented at the second order of the polynomial.
The first step of the analysis is shown in Table 3. The effect of introducing a cap on
total spending for municipalities with a population between 3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants
17Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and results are controlled considering different
bandwidths.
18This is true on the right and left hand side of the cutoff level Pc and in the treatment year and
previous one, for each case analyzed. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level and robustness
checks are performed considering different functional orders.
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during the period t1 and t2 (Case IA) does not produce a significant effect on either
consumption or investment for any model specification. Moreover, moving forward of one
period (Case IB), and thus studying the effects when the cap is removed, also does not
provide any significant effects on both types of spending19.
[Table 3 about here]
It can be affirmed that the cap on the overall level of public spending is not capable
of significantly influencing the composition of the budget spending. Intuitively, the cap
was not sufficiently binding (as shown in section 3, the fiscal rule allowed for a maximum
increase of total spending of 11.5%, compared to the average of the previous three years)
and both groups reported a behavior that was not significantly different between each
other. Therefore, in this framework, the cap on overall spending is not effective and thus
it can be seen as a placebo treatment with no effect on budget outcome decisions. These
findings are confirmed by the graphical representation of the difference-in-discontinuity
approach. In fact, Figure 6 shows the difference between budget outcomes, generated by
the difference between t0 and t−1, between Group A and Group B. At the cutoff level,
there is a vertical line to highlight a possible discontinuity. Consumption does not show
any discontinuity at the thresholds, while the jump shown by investment is not significant.
[Figure 6 about here]
Before showing the results, it should be noted that there are potentially two
contemporaneous treatment. In particular, in the period considered by Case IIA, Group
B is exempted from the DSP in t1 and subject to it in t2, while there is a variation of
the fiscal rule for Group C from “budget balance” to “total expenditure cap”. Moving
forward one period (Case IIB), Group B is no longer subject to the DSP in t3 and there
is a further variation from the “budget balance” to “consumption and investment caps”
for Group C. In order to disentangle these two treatments, we need to rely on the
evidence provided in the first step. The treatment assigned to Group B is claimed not to
be effective in both t2 and t3 and therefore in Case II the treatment is the fiscal rule
variation for Group C. Consequently, Group B and C are the control and treated group,
respectively.
We can now focus on the results. Case IIA shows the effect of a variation of the fiscal
rule for Group C from the “budget balance” to the “total expenditure cap”. As shown in
19The effects are not significant, further deepening the analysis at subcategories of consumption
and investment (consumption: wages, raw material, services and interests paid on debt; investment:
infrastructures, goods for internal production, durable goods, consulting services, transfers and credits).
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the top part of table 4, there is no evidence for a significant effect of this variation. This
result provides evidence in the direction of the first step, with Case IA, Case IB and Case
IIA highlighting that the “total expenditure cap” does not have an impact in terms of
affecting budget spending composition.
The last analysis (Case IIB) shows the effect of introducing two different caps: one for
consumption and another for investment. As further explained in section 3, the fiscal rule
imposed a decrease in consumption and allowed for an increase in investment spending.
The bottom part of table 4 highlights that the outcome is consistent with the fiscal
rule aim: from t2 to t3 consumption diminished by 28 Euro per-capita, while investment
increased by 180 Euro per-capita. Considering subcategories of budget spending, there is
evidence that consumption variations are mainly due to movements in wages (+11 Euro
per-capita) and services (-35 Euro per-capita) spending. In terms of investment, the main
subcategory to vary is infrastructure, which accounts for 83.5% of the overall variation.
Considering that municipalities are only allowed to generate new debt20 to finance
investment spending, it seems reasonable to verify what happened to this specific category.
For this reason, Table 4 includes a row related to the deficit level for Case IIB. In line
with the Golden Rule, the variation of investment and deficit have the same sign and a
comparable magnitude, thus providing evidence that an increase in investment fosters a
higher deficit level.
[Table 4 about here]
The empirical findings are supported by Figure 7. In Case IIA the behavior of Group
2 and Group 3 is substantially the same, while in Case IIB there is evidence of a
discontinuity due to a variation in services and infrastructure spending. In addition, this
is also confirmed by the jump in deficit spending.
[Figure 7 about here]
6.1 Robustness checks
Smaller municipalities have, on average, a higher level of consumption and investment,
which might be due to geographical factors21.
20Which is named deficit, as explained in section 4.
21Municipalities situated on the mountains have different issues compared to those located in a plain
area, such as higher spending for street maintenance and costs related to the snow. In the empirical
analysis there are dummies to control for it.
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In order to assess the results’ robustness, specific aspects of the municipalities are taken
into account, including further peculiarities, as follows: (i) Surface (in Km2): different
territory extensions would likely require a dissimilar budget structure spending. For
instance, a wider area would probably include more paved roads and therefore involve
higher maintenance costs; (ii) Altitude level (in meters); (iii) Macro-areas dummies: Italy
is characterized by economical and cultural differences between the north, center and
south, therefore I control for North West, North East, Centre and South areas; (iv)
Geographical dummies: factors such as mountains, hills, plains and coasts might affect
spending choices; thus, the following dummies are also included: inland mountain, coastal
mountain, inland hill, coastal hill, plain.
The LLR model (3) becomes:
Ymt =α0 + α1P˜m +Gm(β0 + β1P˜m)+
+ t0(γ0 + γ1P˜m +Gm(δ0 + δ1P˜m)) + φX+ mt
(5)
where X is a vector of the covariates and φ is a vector of the related coefficients. The
SPA model (4) becomes:
Ymt =
η∑
n=0
(αkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(βkP˜
η
m)+
+ t0[
η∑
n=0
(γkP˜
η
m) +Gm
η∑
n=0
(δkP˜
η
m)] + φX+ mt
(6)
where X and φ are defined as in model (5).
Tables 5 and 6 confirm the main findings for the four Cases examined. The only result
that it is not robust is the wage variation: there are no significant effects of an impact of
the DSP on it.
[Table 5 and Table 6 about here]
6.2 Comments
Through the empirical analysis, it has been possible to show that the Domestic Stability
Pact is a vehicle for the central government to implement different kinds of local fiscal
rules. Specifically, the cap on total spending did not have a significant effect on the budget
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composition either for municipalities that were not subject to the DSP the year before its
implementation (as shown in Case IA and Case IB) or those already constrained (Case
IIA). It is possible that the policy maker wanted to implement a more binding rule and for
this reason changed it in the following year (t3), imposing different caps on consumption
and investment spending. This new fiscal rule was able to significantly influence budget
composition, generating a negative variation in the amount of services provided by more
than 3% of the total budget, as well an increase in infrastructure spending by about 15%
(compared to the unconstrained municipalities).
7 Final remarks
Coordination rules between state and local government levels are fundamental to
guarantee overall sound public finance. Unsurprisingly, the European integration process
considers fiscal rules as a central subject for stability and growth purposes. This paper
studies the effects of the Domestic Stability Pact on Italian municipalities budget
composition and thanks to the peculiar framework that characterizes the Pact, has been
able to perform a natural experiment implementing a Difference-in-Discontinuity design.
The analysis provides two main contributions.
Firstly, there is a discrimination between effective and ineffective fiscal rules. What
emerges from the analysis is that the DSP is not effective per se, but rather the kind
of fiscal rule implemented is crucial. In fact, it has been shown that imposing a cap
on the overall level of current and capital expenditure does not affect budget decisions.
Interestingly, imposing separate caps on consumption and investment spending creates an
effective boundary, capable of affecting budget composition.
Secondly, effective fiscal rules do not equally affect all the types of spending. In
particular, imposing a cut on consumption generates a decrease in the amount of services
provided. Allowing for an increase in investment creates an increase in both infrastructure
spending and the deficit level.
Therefore, fiscal rules set at the national level are able to significantly affect spending
choices at the local level, both in statistical and economic terms. This evidence shows
the existence of a trade-off, whereby rules that favor investment also cause a deficit. The
policy maker should take into account these design issues: on one hand, only certain rules
are actually binding and, on the other hand, rules might have effects that go beyond the
initial normative goal.
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A Tables
Table 1: Fiscal rules imposed by the Domestic Stability Pact to Italian Municipalities.
Year Group A Group B Group C
t1 None None Budget balance
t2 None Total expenditure cap Total expenditure cap
t3 None None Consumption and Investment caps
Notes. t1, t2 and t3 are respectively years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Group A, Group B and
Group C represent, respectively, municipalities with a population below 3,000, between
3,000 and 5,000, above 5,000 inhabitants.
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Table 3: Domestic Stability Pact effects in Case I.
LLR1 LLR2 SPA
Case IA
Consumption 6.78 7.54 7.70
(9.32) (10.58) (11.54))
Investment 90.74 111.72 74.46
(68.40) (74.20) (93.21)
Case IB
Consumption 2.07 2.81 -5.59
(8.06) (9.31) (12.50)
Investment 4.62 -22.04 -85.55
(63.52) (65.61) (87.76)
Obs. 4,078 3,446 5,870
Notes. Case I refers to Municipalities
between 1,000 and 5,000 inhabitants. Case IA
considers t1 and t2 while Case IB analyzes t2
and t3. LLR1 and LLR2 are Local Linear
Regressor methods as in equation (3), with
a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation
method of order 2, as in equation (4), and
considers all the Municipalities. Values are
in Euro per-capita and deflated using t3
as reference year. Robust standard errors
are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10%
level is represented by *, at the 5% level by
**, at the 1% level by ***.
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Table 4: Domestic Stability Pact effects in Case II.
LLR1 LLR2 SPA
Case IIA
Consumption 9.60 -2.05 4.69
(9.49) (12.62) (15.77)
Investment 4.44 6.70 -44.68
(80.13) (90.19) (119.15)
Case IIB
Consumption -27.97*** -23.03* -28.54*
(10.20) (11.84) (14.61)
Wages 11.03*** 12.93*** 10.73**
(3.00) (3.53) (4.40)
Services -35.40*** -34.05*** -37.22***
(6.72) (7.67) (9.49)
Investment 179.58*** 188.45** 193.83**
(69.04) (76.66) (93.59)
Infrastructure 149.97*** 164.44*** 171.69**
(54.03) (60.12) (73.21)
Deficit 103.22** 110.40** 141.07**
(41.28) (46.17) (56.96)
Obs. 1,880 1,618 2,728
Notes. Case II refers to Municipalities between 3,000
and 7,000 inhabitants. Case IIA considers t1 and t2
while Case IIB analyzes t2 and t3. LLR1 and LLR2
are Local Linear Regressor methods as in equation
(3), with a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation method
of order 2, as in equation (4), and considers all the
Municipalities. Values are in Euro per-capita and
deflated using t3 as reference year. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, at the 1%
level by ***.
23
Table 5: Robustness checks in Case I.
LLR LLR Spline
(b=1,500) (b=1,300) (order 2)
Case IA
Consumption 3.21 4.78 2.28
(9.87) (11.09) (11.48)
Investment 56.86 74.74 37.72
(68.01) (73.31) (93.26)
Case IB
Consumption -2.09 -1.19 -8.66
(7.95) (9.22) (12.28)
Investment -35.89 -56.85 -115.28
(63.58) (66.02) (88.55)
Obs. 4,078 3,446 5,870
Notes. Case I refers to Municipalities between 1,000
and 5,000 inhabitants. Case IA considers t1 and t2
while Case IB analyzes t2 and t3. LLR1 and LLR2
are Local Linear Regressor methods as in equation
(5), with a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation method
of order 2, as in equation (6), and considers all the
Municipalities. Values are in Euro per-capita and
deflated using t3 as reference year. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, at the 1%
level by ***.
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Table 6: Robustness checks in Case II.
LLR LLR Spline
(b=1,500) (b=1,300) (order 2)
Case IIA
Consumption 6.84 -4.86 4.42
(9.59) (12.74) (16.13)
Investment -26.75 -29.78 -77.15
(79.36) (89.42) (119.29)
Case IIB
Consumption -32.32*** -27.57** -29.68**
(10.44) (12.18) (15.03)
Wages 4.57 5.22 4.65
(2.90) (3.35) (4.21)
Services -30.57*** -28.19*** -30.33***
(6.76) (7.72) (9.61)
Investment 142.38** 144.22* 156.04*
(68.75) (76.37) (93.41)
Infrastructure 119.25** 127.30** 141.68*
(53.43) (59.36) (72.91)
Deficit 97.15** 102.67** 134.51**
(41.58) (46.48) (57.23)
Obs. 1,880 1,618 2,728
Notes. Case II refers to Municipalities between 3,000
and 7,000 inhabitants. Case IIA considers t1 and t2
while Case IIB analyzes t2 and t3. LLR1 and LLR2
are Local Linear Regressor methods as in equation
(5), with a bandwidth of respectively 1,500 and 1,300.
SPA is the Spline Polynomial Approximation method
of order 2, as in equation (6), and considers all the
Municipalities. Values are in Euro per-capita and
deflated using t3 as reference year. Robust standard
errors are in parenthesis and are clustered at the
Municipality level. Significance at the 10% level is
represented by *, at the 5% level by **, at the 1%
level by ***.
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B Figures
Figure 1: Number of default of Italian Municipalities between 1989 and 2012 by
Regions. Source: Corte dei Conti.
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Figure 2: Italian Municipalities spending as a percentage of GDP (period between 1990
and 2010). Source: Istat, author’s calculations.
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Figure 3: Level of Consumption over Investment for the three groups of Municipalities
in the period between 2004 and 2006. Source: Ministry of the Interior, author’s
calculations.
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Figure 4: Identification strategy, Case IA and Case IB
Figure 5: Identification strategy, Case IIA and Case IIB
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Figure 6: Difference-in-discontinuities in Case I. Threshold at 3,000 inhabitants. The
central line is a SPA of order 2 and the later lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50 inhabitants. On the vertical axis there
are the t0-t−1 budget values. On the horizontal axis there is the actual population size.
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Figure 7: Difference-in-discontinuities in Case II. Threshold at 5,000 inhabitants. The
central line is a SPA of order 2 and the later lines represent the 95% confidence interval.
Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50 inhabitants. On the vertical axis there
are the t0-t−1 budget values. On the horizontal axis there is the actual population size.
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